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Information and Export Decisions: 


















This paper examines how firms’ decision to start exporting is affected by the availability of 
information on export markets. Unlike existing studies which focus on information sharing among 
firms, we are interested in the information provided by firms’ main bank. Specifically, using a unique 
dataset containing information on both Japanese firms’ export activities and their main banks’ 
experience in transacting with other exporting firms, we examine whether main banks act as a conduit 
of information on export markets. We find that information spillovers through main banks positively 
affect client firms’ decision to start exporting (extensive margin), implying that information on foreign 
markets provided by banks substantially reduces the fixed entry cost of exporting. On the other hand, 
we do not find any evidence that information provided by banks has an effect on the export volume or 
on the growth rate of exports (intensive margin). Our results highlight that channels of information 
spillovers other than those examined in the literature so far may be of considerable importance. 
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 The relationship between globalization and firms’ performance has been the subject of 
numerous studies, which have tended to find that there is a positive relationship between the two. 
Yet, researchers’ understanding of the dynamic behavior of firms in a globalized economy is still 
far from sufficient to propose specific policies that help firms to grow in such an environment. For 
instance, micro-data analyses on various countries confirm that the international performance of a 
country tends to hinge on a handful of high-performing firms (Mayer and Ottaviano 2008), 
suggesting that increasing the number of firms involved in international activities is important for 
the successful internationalization of a country. However, both theoretical and empirical research 
to date has not produced an adequate answer to the question of how to increase the number of 
firms involved in international activities. For example, although there is wide empirical support 
for the theoretical prediction that firms with higher productivity are more likely to become 
exporters, a growing number of studies is producing results suggesting that productivity 
advantages alone do not sufficiently explain the self-selection of firms into exporting. Such studies 
(see, e.g., Bernard et al. 2003; Mayer and Ottaviano 2008; and Todo 2011) point out that while 
such productivity advantages certainly do appear to exist, their impact is economically negligible. 
This implies that our knowledge about the determinants of the export decision remains very 
limited and no conclusive answer has yet been found as to what factors are important for firms to 
become an exporter and grow through exporting.  
 The international trade literature suggests that to start exporting firms incur sunk fixed 
costs, since initially they are uncertain about their export profitability and they have to collect a 
considerable amount of relevant information on export markets. Moreover, firms need to modify 
products to suit local tastes and set up distribution networks. Developing a theoretical model, 
Melitz (2003) therefore suggests that only firms which are sufficiently productive to cover such 
fixed costs can be exporters. The above-mentioned empirical studies examining this hypothesis, 
however, indicate that there must be other important factors which affect firms’ decision to export. 
In other words, they suggest that even when their productivity is not very high firms can be 
exporters as long as other critical conditions are satisfied. 
 The extant literature has focused on a number of conditions or factors that may affect 
firms’ export decision. One important research strand in this context concentrates on export 
spillovers. The idea is that information exchange with other exporting firms reduces the individual 
fixed costs associated with exporting, and that such information exchange therefore increases the 
probability that a firm will export (see, e.g., Krautheim, 2007, for a theoretical analysis).
1
 Having 
                                                  
1 Other strands in the literature examine the relationship between firms’ export status and their innovative capacity, 
the price and/or quality of their product, various country characteristics, and institutional factors such as free trade 
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access to information on foreign markets, the hypothesis goes, substantially reduces uncertainty 
and encourages firms to engage in export activities. Empirical work by Koenig et al. (2010) 
confirms this hypothesis by finding that the presence of other exporters has a positive effect on the 
export decision of other firms. Although Koenig et al. (2010) find evidence of positive export 
spillovers, the evidence produced by other empirical studies on such export spillovers is at best 
weak (e.g., Aitken et al. 1997, Barrios et al. 2003, Bernard and Jensen 2004), which means that the 
search for possible channels of information spillovers continues. 
 Against this background, this study focuses on information provided by lender banks as 
one potential channel of information spillovers. Most existing empirical studies examining 
information spillovers from other exporting firms assume that firms in the same region and/or 
industry are likely to exchange information with each other; however, such studies do not 
explicitly discuss the channel through which such information exchange takes place. The 
hypothesis we examine here is that lender banks work as a conduit for such information. In the 
case of Japan, lender banks provide not only financial support but also business consulting 
services utilizing extensive knowledge collected through their lending transaction relationships 
and from various information sources. Since the monitoring of borrower firms is important for 
banks, banks in general should accumulate information on borrower firms and related parties. 
Thus, if we assume that a particular bank is very knowledgeable about overseas business 
opportunities either through its own banking activities or transactions with client firms with 
experience in exporting, potential exporter firms would find it helpful to consult with such a bank. 
That financial institutions may indeed play an important role in determining client firms’ export 
activities has recently been highlighted in studies by Amiti and Weinstein (2011) and Paravisini et 
al. (2011), which indicate that banks’ financial health plays an important role in determining firms’ 
export behavior. Inui et al. (2011), for example, focus on banks’ ability to screen, monitor, and 
advise client firms as a determinant of export behavior. Specifically, using a measure of banks’ 
efficiency as a proxy for their ability to screen, monitor, and advise client firms, they find that 
bank efficiency has a positive effect on the export decision and overseas sales ratio of client firms.  
The aim of this paper is to explore the role of banks as information providers by 
explicitly quantifying banks’ ability to provide information on export markets using a unique panel 
                                                                                                                                               
agreements, economic diplomacy, and so on. Moreover, especially since the 2008 global financial crisis, the impact 
of credit constraints on firms’ export decision has gained growing attention among researchers and policy makers. 
Because exporting involves higher entry costs than selling in the domestic market and most entry costs must be 
paid up front, only firms with sufficient liquidity can meet them. Based on this line of reasoning, Chaney (2005) 
augmented a Melitz-type model with liquidity constraints and suggests that financial frictions affect the selection 
of firms into exporting. Several studies, such as Bellone et al. (2010), Muûls (2008), Manova et al. (2011), 
Feenstra et al. (2011), and Minetti and Zhu (2011), have produced evidence indicating that credit constraints 
severely restrict firms’ export capacity. 
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dataset for Japan in which firms are matched to lender banks.
2
 In fact, Japanese Bankers 
Association (2011) provides various examples of how banks provide supporting services to firms 
when the firms start exporting to a new foreign market and/or open affiliates or branches overseas. 
According to the report, banks not only provide financial support to firms but also actively 
introduce them to foreign firms that are potential business partners or providers of business 
supporting services.
3
 We therefore conjecture that banks play a crucial role in substantially 
reducing the fixed entry costs incurred by client firms when starting to export. Specifically, we 
hypothesize that the provision of information by lender banks helps firms to start exporting based 
on the same mechanisms that information exchange with other exporting firms helps potential 
export starters. To examine this hypothesis, we focus on firms’ main bank which, in line with 
previous studies, we define as the top lender bank of a firm and investigate the importance of 
information flows from the main bank to client firms as a source of spillovers.
4
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in at least two ways. First, it is the first 
study to examine the export decision by using a dataset that makes it possible to link firm-level 
information with information on the major lender banks of each firm. The paper explores the 
impact of information spillovers through main banks on both firms’ decision to start exporting (the 
extensive margin) and on the volume exported by each firm (the intensive margin). Second, the 
paper investigates whether the importance of information provided by banks differs across export 
destination regions and examines what type of information – that is, general information on 
overseas markets regardless of the destination or destination-specific information –  is more 
relevant for firms’ export decision. 
Our results show that information on overseas markets provided by a main bank 
substantially reduces the fixed costs of starting exporting for a firm and thereby increases the 
probability that the firm will start exporting. However, the effect of such information on the 
volume of exports is not very clear. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the roles that 
main banks play in Japan and presents the empirical strategy. Section 3 describes the dataset used 
                                                  
2 This paper explicitly looks at main banks’ ability as a provider of information on foreign markets, while Inui et 
al. (2011) focus on banks’ efficiency or profitability, which is assumed to capture banks’ overall ability as both a 
funds supplier and an information provider. 
3 We also interviewed an assistant general manager at the international business support office at a regional bank 
and found that not only large (city) banks but also many regional banks have been making strong efforts to support 
client firms trying to expand international transactions and business.  
4 Of course, there are several other sources from which firms obtain information on export markets. Economic 
diplomacy and chambers of commerce in destination countries (Creusen and Lejour 2011) are another source of 
information on foreign markets, although we do not address the role of economic diplomacy here due to data 
constraints. As described below, in our dataset information on the destination of exports is only available at the 
broad region level (e.g., North America or Asia) and not at the country level. Yet another potentially important 
conduit for information on export markets is trading companies and wholesalers. Unfortunately, we cannot identify 
transaction relationships between exporter firms and trading companies. 
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in this paper and provides some descriptive statistics on our sample firms. Next, Section 4 presents 
our estimation results. Finally, Section 5 discusses the policy implications and concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Strategy 
2.1 The Main Bank System in Japan 
The “main bank system” has been a key feature of Japan’s economic system that can be 
traced back as far as the early post-war period.
5
 In this system, a firm’s “main bank” usually is the 
bank from which it has borrowed the most and with which it typically has a long-term 
relationships. In addition, it is widely argued that main banks not only provide loans to client firms 
but also play a consulting role by providing relevant business information. In addition, main banks 
may get involved in the management of a firm in times of distress. Although the extent and form 
of main banks’ involvement in firms’ management in times of financial difficulties have been 
changing over time, main banks are still perceived to play an important role as providers of both 
funds and information to their client firms. 
Trying to provide a theoretical underpinning for such long-term relationships between 
main banks and borrower firms, Patrick (1994) argues that such relationships enable banks to gain 
access to “soft information” on borrower firms, which helps to raise the efficiency of loan 
screening and borrower monitoring. The argument that repeated bank loan transactions lead to the 
accumulation of soft information on client firms has also been voiced in more recent studies such 
as Degryse et al. (2009). 
Such soft information on borrower firms and banks’ own ability to collect information 
on industry-, region-, and nation-wide businesses has been helping Japanese main banks to 
provide effective and useful financial and consulting services to their client firms, and thereby has 
been contributing both to main banks’ profits and the growth of their client firms’ business. 
Particularly in recent years, aware of the fact that the growth prospects for Japan’s domestic 
market are not very promising and domestic manufacturing production has in fact been shrinking, 
banks have been promoting various services to support client firms’ international activities. With 
more and more Japanese large firms relocating production overseas, smaller domestic firms are 
forced to reduce their output, resulting in falling demand of funds, which in turn reduces business 
opportunities for banks in Japan. Moreover, if banks’ existing client firm went out of business, 
banks would not only lose current business but also future business in which to utilize the 
firm-specific soft information they have accumulated. Thus, faced with a potentially shrinking 
market at home, many banks in recent years have put greater emphasis on providing support 
                                                  
5 For an overview of the origins of the main bank system, see, e.g., Hoshi and Kashyap (2001). 
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services to client firms seeking to exploit growth opportunities overseas.   
Concrete examples of the kind of support services that banks provide to their borrowers 
to help them with regard to international activities are provided by a Japanese Bankers Association 
(JBA) report (Japanese Bankers Association 2011). According to the report, other than traditional 
banking services such as the usual loan business, deposit services, payment services, lease and 
leaseback deals, or the issue of stand-by letters of credit, main banks often provide client firms 
with information on potential business partners in foreign countries as well as advice on recruiting 
employees, advertising, tax systems, and administrative issues such as accounting systems and 
laws and regulations. These examples indicate that banks provide not only financial transactions 
but also information services, and in the report, the JBA cites a survey it conducted according to 
which 38 out of 43 Japanese banks with activities in Asia say they provide services other than loan, 
deposit, and payment services. Specifically, 32 out of the 38 banks with activities in Asia say they 
provide information related to investment (i.e., tax and accounting systems, etc.), while 31 banks 
provide opportunities for business matching (e.g., organizing business matching events for 
Japanese firms and local partners). In addition, many banks provide information on firms located 
in destination regions (14 banks), loan guarantees (12 banks), and support with export and import 
procedure (8 banks). 
 
2.2 Empirical Approach 
    This section explains the empirical strategy we employ to investigate the determinants 
of the export decision and of the export volume. We are particularly interested in the impact of 
information provided by main banks on the probability that a firm starts exporting (i.e., the 
extensive margin) and on the export volume (i.e., the intensive margin). Following previous 
empirical studies on the determinants of the extensive and intensive margin (e.g., Koenig et al. 
2010, Minetti and Zhu 2011), we assume that firm i starts exporting if its profits are larger when 
exporting than when not exporting. Let πijt
*
 represent the difference between the profits of firm i 
when it starts exporting to destination j at time t and its profits when it does not start exporting to 
destination j at time t. The difference is determined by firm characteristics (e.g., size, productivity, 
and the skill level of workers), the firm’s financial conditions (e.g., the leverage ratio, liquidity 
ratio, and short-term loan ratio), and the amount of information on the export market available to 
the firm. The availability of information on the export market is assumed to substantially lower the 
uncertainty of profits from exporting and hence, to lower either the variable or the fixed cost of 
exporting. While export spillovers are also taken into account, we are particularly interested in 







∗ = α1 + Zitβ1 + Iijtγ1 + εijt 
 
where Zit is a vector of controls for firm characteristics and the firm’s financial conditions which 
may affect firm i’s differential profits πijt
*
; Iijt is a vector of variables representing information 
available to the firm; and εijt captures unobserved firm characteristics and other unknown factors 
that may also affect differential profits. 
    We assume that firm i starts exporting if the differential profits πijt
*
>0. Under the 
assumption that εijt is a normally distributed random error with zero mean and unit variance, the 
probability that firm i starts exporting can be written as:  
 
 Probijt = Prob(α1 + Zitβ1 + Iijtγ1 + εijt > 0)                          (1) 
 
In the first instance, we estimate Eq. (1) with a random effect panel probit approach. In 
order to take any potential endogeneity into account, we lag all right-hand side variables by one 
year.
6
 The dependent variable Probijt denotes the change in export status at the firm- or 
firm-destination level and takes a value of 1 if a firm exports for the first time (overall) or the first 
time to destination j at time t. We define a firm as an export starter if the firm did not export over 
the last three years from t-3 to t-1 and exports at time t. Probijt takes a value of 0 if a firm did not 
export to destination j for the last three years prior to year t and does not export in year t. Firms 
which always export to destination j are not included in our analysis. Regarding control variables 
for firm characteristics and the firm’s financial conditions (Zit), we include firm size (the log of the 
number of employees of firm i), the TFP level of the firm, and the average wage rate of the firm as 
a proxy for the skill level of workers. Based on the results of both theoretical and empirical studies, 
we expect these variables to be positively correlated with firms’ export decision. Further, to take 
the impact of liquidity constraints on firms’ export behavior into account, we include variables 
representing firms’ financial situation, such as their leverage ratio, their liquidity ratio, and the 
share of short-term loan in their total loans outstanding. The reason for including these variables is 
that, as highlighted by, e.g., Manova et al. (2011), Feenstra et al. (2011), and Minetti and Zhu 
(2011), financial constraints are likely to prevent firms from exporting because firms need 
sufficient liquidity in order to meet the entry costs associated with starting exporting. Therefore, 
we expect that firms with more liquidity are more likely to start exporting. 
                                                  
6 As we will detail later, in order to address the endogeneity problem, we use a limited sample restricted to firms 
which maintained a relationship with their top lender (i.e., main bank) during the three years prior to the 
observation period. By doing so, we exclude cases where firms possibly changed their main bank in preparing to 
start exporting, i.e., cases where the bank and the firm are not randomly matched.  
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  Regarding information available to the firm (Iijt), we include variables representing the 
amount of information on export markets accumulated by a main bank and by a firm itself. The 
explanatory variable of main interest is the amount of information on export markets potentially 
available to the firm through its main bank, which is a proxy for the amount of information firm i’s 
main bank has accumulated on destination j. Specifically, we measure this variable as the ratio of 
the number of the main bank’s client firms that are exporting to destination j to the total number of 
the main bank’s client firms, i.e., the intensity of each main bank’s dealings with exporting firms. 
We conjecture that banks with more extensive dealings with exporter firms more effectively 
accumulate information related to overseas markets. This could be the case when, for example, 
banks allocate limited lending/managerial capacity to each lending activity. Under such 
circumstance, a higher intensity of dealing with exporting firms represents the extent to which the 
bank focuses (i.e., allocates internal resources with higher priority) on the lending activities 
accompanied by the provision of overseas market information. In addition, in order to take into 
account the information accumulated by firms themselves through their own international 
activities, we also include variables representing their overseas activities, such as the share of 
overseas employees in a firm’s total number of employees and the share of overseas investment in 
a firm’s total investment.
7
 Industry dummies (for fifteen manufacturing industries) and time 
dummies are also included in order to control for industry-specific and time-specific fixed effects. 
While Eq. (1) focuses on the extensive margin, i.e., whether firms start exporting, we 
also examine the role of information spillovers through the main bank on the intensive margin, i.e., 
the export volume after firms start exporting. To do so, we adapt Eq. (1) above as follows: 
 
 EXPijt = α2 + Zitβ2 + Iijtγ2 + εijt                            (2) 
 
where EXPijt is the log of firm i’s exports to destination j at time t. We also use the first-difference 
of the log of exports (i.e., the growth rate of exports) as a dependent variable for an alternative 
specification. The variables on the right-hand side are the same as those in Eq. (1) and we again 
lag all variables by one year. As above, the variable we are most interested in is the amount of 
information on export markets potentially available to the firm through its main bank. 
That the provision of information by the main bank may affect not only the extensive 
margin but also the intensive margin is suggested by the theoretical analysis by Rauch and Watson 
                                                  
7 In addition, as highlighted in previous studies, there may be some spillovers from nearby exporters. In order to 
examine whether this is the case, we included dummies for the region in which firms’ headquarters are located in 
order to control for export spillovers and other region-specific factors. However, we found that the region dummies 
were not significant and including them did not increase the explanatory power of our results, so that we decided to 
omit them here. A possible reason is that the headquarters of most firms in our sample are concentrated in a small 
number of prefectures (Tokyo, Osaka, and Hyogo prefectures).  
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(2003), who examine the relationship between the search costs for establishing new partnerships 
and export volumes. They suggest that the higher the costs of searching for a new supplier, the 
smaller tend to be the orders a buyer places with a supplier. In addition, buyers tend to place larger 
orders with suppliers once they know that the latter is able to fulfill larger orders. Based on this 
idea, if banks help in matching businesses in overseas markets and provide information to both the 
buyer and the supplier on their respective counterpart, this should substantially reduce uncertainty 
and possibly result in higher transaction volumes. We test this hypothesis by examining whether 
information spillovers through the main bank have a positive effect on the intensive margin or not.  
We should note that in the estimation of Eq. (2) non-exporters are excluded from the sample used 
for analysis. In cases such as here, where there is a risk of a selection bias, a typical solution 
employed often is to use a Heckman selection model. However, we do not employ the Heckman 
model and estimate Eq.s (1) and (2) separately, since it is difficult to find a variable which strongly 
affects the selection process (Eq. (1)) but not the outcome (Eq. (2)).
8
 Therefore, we estimate Eq. 
(2) separately from Eq. (1), employing the fixed-effect panel estimation method. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Data Description 
The data used in this study are the firm-level panel data from the Basic Survey on 
Business Structure and Activities (BSBSA) collected annually by Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI) for the period 1997-2008. The survey is compulsory and covers all firms with at 
least 50 employees or 30 million yen of paid-in capital in the Japanese manufacturing, mining, and 
wholesale and retail sectors and several other service sectors. The survey contains detailed 
information on firm-level business activities such as the 3-digit industry in which the firm operates, 
its number of employees, sales, purchases, exports, and imports (including a breakdown of the 
destination of sales and exports and the origin of purchases and imports).
9,10
 It also contains R&D 
expenditures and patents owned, the number of domestic and overseas subsidiaries, and various 
other financial data such as costs, profits, investment, debt and assets.  
                                                  
8 Although some previous studies employ a Heckman model to deal with selection bias (e.g., Bellone et al. 2010), 
not all do (see, e.g., Koenig et al. 2010, Paravisini et al. 2011, Manova et al. 2011). Moreover, for our data, finding 
an exogenous variable that is excluded from the export volume equation is extremely difficult. Although variables 
representing entry barriers to each export destination may be promising candidates for such an exogenous variable, 
we did not employ this approach here. The reason is that our information on export destinations is limited to 
destination regions (eight broad regions in the world), so that we do not have sufficient variation in entry barriers 
(see footnote 9).  
9 The survey asks for the amount as well as the destination or origin of exports and imports broken down into 
seven regions (Asia, Middle East, Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa, and Oceania). Unfortunately, 
more detailed information on the destination of exports and origin of imports is not available. 
10 Although the survey also asks non-manufacturing firms for information on exports and imports, they are 




The key aim of our analysis, as mentioned above, is to investigate the importance of 
information on destination markets and advice provided by main banks to their client firms. To do 
so, we combine the firm-level data with information on firms’ main bank and examine the 
relationships between firm characteristics, main banks’ ability to provide advice, and firms’ export 
status. We augment the firm-level panel data taken from the BSBSA with information on firm 
characteristics stored in the Development Bank of Japan Corporate Financial Databank. We then 
merge the dataset with information on the main bank for each firm using the loan relation 
information stored in the NEEDS Financial Quest database. This database also includes various 
types of information on main banks. 
Although the BSBSA includes a large number of unlisted firms, we have to restrict our 
sample to listed firms because the information on firms’ bank loan relationships is available for 
listed firms only. Yet, even though we limit our sample to listed companies so that we can match 
firms to their main bank, our dataset nevertheless includes a considerable number of relatively 
small firms, which are listed on the stock exchange markets for start-up companies, and some of 
them are first-time exporters. Moreover, once firms have started exporting, many of them expand 
the range of destinations to which they export, so that when we examine the determinants of 
whether firms start exporting to a new destination, we can include more observations in our 
analysis.  
Our unbalanced panel data contain approximately 300–400 listed firms per year, 
approximately 5 percent of which are identified as export starters.
11
 Although the number of pure 
first-time exporters is limited, there are a substantial number of exporters that expanded or reduced 
the number of destinations to which they exported during our observation period. 
 
3.2 Variables 
 Let us now describe the variables for our estimation in detail. Basic statistics of all 
variables are provided in Table 1. Starting with the dependent variable, to estimate the extensive 
margin we construct three kinds of dummy variables. The first of these is NEW_EXP, which takes 
a value of 1 if the firm did not export to any of the regions considered in our analysis (i.e., Asia, 
North America, Central and South America, Africa, and Oceania) in years t-3 to t-1 but exported in 
                                                  
11 We were able to match the BSBSA data with the other two databases for approximately 9,300 observations in 
the manufacturing sector. However, the sample size for our analysis is at most 3,000 observations. The reasons are 
as follows. First, we exclude firms which have positive exports throughout our observation period (“always” 
exporters), since our focus is on the decision to start exporting. Second, firms for which data on bank loan 
transactions are not available are excluded from our dataset. Third, as we employ a three-year window for 
identifying first-time exporters, firms which frequently changed their export status are excluded from our dataset. 
Namely, in our analysis, export starters are defined as firms that started exporting in year t but did not export in 





 The aim of using this three-year window is to identify export starters as unambiguously 
as possible. While employing this definition means that export starters still include firms that have 
past export experience and therefore are not pure first-time exporters, using a three-year window 
should reduce any possible biases arising from the misidentification of new exporters.
13
 The 
second, alternative dependent variable we use is NEW_EXP_REGION, which takes a value of 1 if 
the firm did not export to one of the regions we focus on (i.e., Asia, North America, Central and 
South America, Africa, and Oceania) in years t-3 to t-1 but did export to one of those regions in 
year t. The third dependent variable is defined by region. Thus, NEW_EXP_ASIA takes a value of 
1 if the firm did not export to Asia in years t-3 to t-1 but did export to Asia in year t. In the same 
manner, we define NEW_EXP_NA, NEW_EXP_CSA, NEW_EXP_AFR, and NEW_EXP_OCE, for 
the decision to export to North America, Central and South America, Africa, and Oceania, 
respectively. 
 Let us next look at our explanatory variables. The variable we are particularly interested 
in is the variable measuring the potential information spillovers through a main bank, BANKINFO. 
In order to construct the BANKINFO variable, we first construct the variable NUM_EXPORTER, 
which denotes the number of each bank’s exporting client firms. We should note that for the 
NUM_EXPORTER variable, exporting firms for which a bank is not the main bank (i.e., not the 
top lender) are included. In this sense, we implicitly assume that all loan exposures to firms 
potentially contribute to the accumulation of overseas information at banks.
14
 Therefore, the 
NUM_EXPORTER variable measures how many firms that could serve as a source of overseas 
information a firm’s main bank transacts with. Given that NUM_EXPORTER is highly correlated 
with banks’ size, we define BANKINFO as the ratio of NUM_EXPORTER to the total number of 
the bank’s client firms (NUM_CLIENT). Through this metric, we intend to measure the intensity 
of each bank’s exposure to exporting firms.
15
 Since we have information regarding which regions 
                                                  
12 The BSBSA also specifies other destination regions such as the Middle East and Europe. We ignore these 
regions due to the small number of export starters to those regions. 
13 Identifying pure first-time exporters is not straightforward. In fact, Koenig et al. (2010) consider that a firm is 
an export starter if it did not export in the previous year, while other studies such as Greenaway et al. (2007) and 
Bellone et al. (2010) simply look at whether a firm exports or not in each year. On the other hand, studies such as 
De Loecker (2007) define a firm as an export starter the first time it exported in the dataset. However, even with 
this definition, researchers are often likely to misidentify export starters when the time dimension of the dataset is 
not sufficiently long.  
14 Precisely speaking, we add information about export dynamics stored in the BSBSA to the firm-bank-matched 
data constructed from the Financial Quest database. Then, summing up the total number of firms as well as the 
number of exporting firms to which each bank provides loans in each year, we construct NUM_CLIENT and 
NUM_EXPORTER. An alternative way to construct BANKINFO would be to focus on top lender relationships only. 
We prefer the former approach since it much better reflects the large variation across banks in terms of the extent 
to which they deal with exporting firms. 
15 Whether a bank has branches or subsidiaries abroad and how long these overseas branches or subsidiaries have 
been in operation are alternative measures for banks’ stock of information on overseas markets. However, in this 
paper, we focus on banks’ transaction relationships with exporters, for the following reasons. First, Japanese banks 
drastically reduced the number of overseas branches at the end of the 1990s when the banking sector took drastic 
restructuring measures to dispose of bad debts. Instead, they increasingly engage in business tie-ups with other 
12 
 
each firm exports to, we can also define NUM_EXPORTER and BANKINFO by region. We 
assume that BANKINFO measured regardless of destination regions is a proxy for information 
held by banks on foreign markets in general, while BANKINFO measured for each destination 
region is a proxy for region-specific information held by banks. For each firm, we use the 
BANKINFO variable in order to capture the amount of information provided by the main bank. In 
order to control for the size of the main bank, we also include NUM_CLIENT in our explanatory 
variables.
16
 To illustrate the distribution of NUM_CLIENT and BANKINFO, we tabulate the 
numbers of these two variables for the sample banks in Table 2. 
 One might argue that firms which are thinking of expanding their business overseas 
might try to establish a transaction relationship with a bank which is more likely to have a lot of 
overseas information. Given that such reverse causality could generate simultaneous equation bias 
in our estimation, we limit the sample to firms who had the same main bank throughout year t-3 to 
year t. This allows us to focus on firm-bank pairs where the relationship is independent of the 
firm’s decision to start exporting in year t.
17
  
 As for firm-specific variables, we include variables representing firms’ size, labor 
quality, financial constraints, own overseas activities, and productivity. For firm size we use the 
(logarithm of) the number of employees (LN_NUMWORKER) and for labor quality the average 
wage (WAGE). Regarding financial constraints, we construct a number of variables: the leverage 
of a firm (ratio of total liabilities to total assets, FLEV), the ratio of bank loans to total liabilities 
(FBDEP), the ratio of liquidity assets to liquidity liabilities (FLIQ), and the short-term loan ratio 
(ratio of short-term bank borrowing to total bank borrowing, STLOAN). We construct a number of 
variables representing firms’ own overseas activities: the share of overseas establishments 
(FOR_BRANCH), measured as the ratio of a firm’s number of overseas branches or offices (not 
including overseas subsidiaries or affiliates) to the firm’s total number of establishments, branches, 
or offices, including both domestic and overseas ones; the share of overseas employees 
(FOR_EMP), measured as the ratio of a firm’s number of workers employed in overseas branches 
or offices (not including overseas subsidiaries or affiliates) to the firm’s total number of workers 
                                                                                                                                               
domestic and/or foreign banks to provide international business support services to their client firms. Therefore, we 
do not consider the number of banks’ overseas branches to be a good proxy for the amount of information on 
overseas markets accumulated by banks. Second, the number of overseas branches by country or region for each 
bank is not readily available in the database, while the total number of overseas branches for each bank is available. 
We have to compile the data using various data sources. Nevertheless, considering alternative measures for 
information spillovers through banks in the future would be a worthwhile exercise.  
16 While NUM_CLIENT represents the size of a bank, size is highly correlated with banks’ financial health and 
performance such as efficiency or profitability. Therefore, by including NUM_CLIENT in the explanatory variables, 
we intend to control not only for bank size but also for various other bank characteristics. 
17 In order to rule out any endogeneity bias more rigorously, we could restrict our analysis to firms whose 
relationship with their main bank has been established even longer, or we could employ appropriate instruments 




employed in all establishments, branches, or offices; the overseas investment share (FOR_INV), 
measured as the ratio of a firm’s overseas investment, including portfolio investment, to the firm’s 
total investment; and the overseas lending share (FOR_LOAN), measured as the ratio of a firm’s 




As for firm productivity, which, as mentioned above, is widely considered to be an 
important determinant of the export decision, we use the firm-level TFP data provided in the East 
Asian Listed Companies Database (EALC) 2010.
19
 The firm-level TFP in the database is 
calculated using the multilateral TFP index method developed by Good et al. (1997).
20
 Details on 
the TFP measure are provided in the Appendix.  
 
INSERT Tables 1 & 2 
 
Our firm-bank matched data cover the period from fiscal 1997 to 2008. In order to 
control for the potential influence of outliers, we excluded observations in the tails for each 
variable.21 Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in our empirical 
analysis, while Table 4 shows the distribution of our sample firms by industry and year. As 
can be seen from Table 4, sample firms are concentrated in a limited number of industries 
(e.g., food and kindred products, chemicals, non-electrical machinery, electrical and electronic 
machinery, motor vehicles, transportation equipment and ordnance). 
 
INSERT Tables 3 & 4 
 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 The decision to enter specific markets 
We first examine the determinants of firms’ decision to participate in a new export 
market by estimating Eq. (1). The estimation is conducted using observations for firms which did 
not export during the years t-3 to t (“never” exporters) and observations for firms which did not 
export during the years t-3 to t-1 but exported in year t (first-time exporters). Thus, observations 
                                                  
18 The reason why the number of workers employed by overseas subsidiaries is not included is that the BSBSA 
does not contain such information. Similarly, the reason for using the ratio of overseas investment including 
portfolio investment is that the BSBSA does not allow us to distinguish between direct and portfolio overseas 
investment.  
19 The EALC is jointly compiled by the Japan Center for Economic Research, the Center for Economic 
Institutions (Hitotsubashi University), the Center for China and Asian Studies (Nihon University), and the Center 
for National Competitiveness (Seoul National University). 
20 For details on the TFP calculation, also see Fukao et al. (2011). 




for firms which exported in at least one year during t-3 to t-1 as well as t are excluded in the 
estimation. The results of the random effect probit estimation (average marginal effects) and the 
panel logit estimation (odds ratios) are shown in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. The first two 
columns in Table 5 show the results when we use NEW_EXP as the dependent variable and 
including (Column (1)) or excluding (Column (2)) TFP×BANKINFO among the explanatory 
variables. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the same regressions but using NEW_EXP_REGION as the 
dependent variable. In Columns (1) to (4) in Table 5, we do not distinguish between destination 
regions and the BANKINFO variable is simply the ratio of the number of a firm’s main bank’s 
exporting clients – regardless of the destination region – to the total number of the bank’s client 
firms. BANKINFO here therefore captures the main bank’s general exposure (not specific to a 
destination region) to client firms with export activities.
22
 The same applies to Columns (1) to (3) 
in Table 6. However, in the last column of Tables 5 and 6, we use the region-specific BANKINFO 
variable corresponding to the region to which a firm starts exporting.
23
 In the case where a firm 
starts exporting to more than one region at a time, we randomly assign the region-specific 
BANKINFO. Finally, it should be noted that Columns (1) to (3) in Table 6 show the results using 
the same variables but different models for the panel logit estimation; that is, a population average 
model (PA), a fixed effect model (FE), and a random effect model (RE). 
Looking at the results shown in Table 5 and focusing on the variable of main interest, 
BANKINFO, we find that the coefficient is positive and significant in all estimations. Similarly, 
Table 6, which shows the results based on the panel logit estimation, suggests that main banks 
with greater exposure to firms with overseas business raise the likelihood that their client firms 
start exporting, hinting at the presence of information spillovers from the main bank, which is 
consistent with our prediction. Further, the results in Column (4) in Table 6 suggest that when we 
take account of destination region-specific information, BANKINFO has a significant positive 
effect on firms’ export decision even when we control for firm-specific fixed effects.
24
  
As for the other explanatory variables, firms’ own overseas activities (e.g., the overseas 
employee ratio) have a positive effect on firms’ decision to start exporting in many of the cases. 
                                                  
22 While we lag all the explanatory variables by one year in our estimations, we also estimate the equations in 
Table 5 taking two-year or three-year lags for robustness checks. Taking a longer lag means taking a firm’s 
dynamic decisions into account, as well as being able to address the potential endogeneity between the export 
decision and firm-bank matching. We obtain similar results to those in Table 5 in the case of the two-year lag. On 
the other hand, in the case of the three-year lag the estimated marginal effect of BANKINFO becomes insignificant 
when using NEW_EXP as the dependent variable. These results may suggest that firms begin to prepare two years 
in advance for starting to export. On the other hand, since firms’ export decision may be often made in response to 
short-term demand fluctuations, it may be too early to prepare for exporting three years in advance.  
23  In the case where firms start exporting to more than one region at a time, we randomly assign the 
region-specific BANKINFO. An alternative way would be to use the average of BANKINFO among those regions. 
24 Precisely speaking, the result of the likelihood ratio test presented in Column (5) in Table 5 implies that it is not 
necessary to employ the model with panel-level individual effects once we include the BANKINFO variable 
measured for each destination region (i.e., rho0=0 is not rejected even at the 10% significance level). 
15 
 
On the other hand, for firm size, leverage, and liquidity the results vary depending on the 
estimation procedure and these variables are associated with a higher probability of starting 
exporting only in some cases. 
A notable result is that the TFP level has almost no impact on the export decision. Given 
that the correlation between TFP and the interaction term between TFP and BANKINFO 
(TFPxBANKINFO) is very high for the whole sample, we run the same regressions without the 
interaction term (i.e., Columns (2) and (4) in Table 5). The results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
This result is consistent with the finding in previous studies such as Todo (2011) that TFP is not a 
sufficiently strong factor to explain the export decision of Japanese firms. 
Next, in order to examine whether the effect of region-specific information spillovers 
differs depending on the destination region we split the sample by export destination region. The 
estimation results for the sub-samples by destination region are shown in Table 7. The results 
suggest that BANKINFO has a significant positive effect on firms’ export decision when they start 
exporting to Asia (Column (1)), but that this is not the case for other regions. These results may 
reflect the fact that most Japanese banks have been increasingly putting efforts into their business 
in Asia by expanding service networks there while restructuring services in other regions, 
particularly in developed regions. Furthermore, because first-time exporters to Asia tend to be 
smaller firms than those to other regions, the result may imply that information accumulated in 
main banks is more important for smaller firms, which do not have adequate capabilities to collect 
overseas information by themselves. This line of reasoning is supported by the fact that in Table 7 
firm size has a significantly positive effect on the export decision in all cases except Asia.  
 
4.2 Export volume and export growth 
   Table 8 reports the fixed-effect panel estimation results of Eq. (2). In the estimation, we only 
include observations of first-time exporters, and we examine whether information spillovers 
through main banks affect the export volume (the value of exports in logarithm) or the growth rate 
of exports from year t to year t+1 after the firm started exporting. Beginning with the results in 
Panel (a) of Table 8, we find that the coefficient on BANKINFO is not significant, implying that 
information spillovers do not have a clear effect on the volume of exports (i.e., the intensive 
margin). While firms’ own international activities (the overseas investment ratio in Column (1)) 
tend to have a positive effect on the intensive margin, most of the other explanatory variables do 
not have a significant coefficient. Although it is possible that the results partly reflect the small 
sample size, they suggest that the export volume is mainly explained by firm fixed effects.  
 Next, we further split the sample by destination region and estimate the same equations 
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as in Panel (a) for each destination region. Panel (b) shows the estimated coefficient on 
BANKINFO for each destination region. As can be seen, the coefficient is not significant in most 
cases and the impact of BANKINFO is ambiguous. Although we find a negative and significant 
coefficient on BANKINFO for the cases of North America, Africa, and Oceania, we should note 
that the number of observations is small, particularly in the latter two cases, for which we could 
not calculate F-values. Therefore, we do not obtain clear and robust results for the impact of 
information spillovers on the intensive margin. This is in line with Koenig et al. (2010), who also 
do not find a significant impact of export spillovers on the intensive margin. Although our results 
are consistent with their results, which factors affect the intensive margin of exports is an issue 
that deserves further scrutiny.  
   
4.3 Robustness checks 
 As a robustness check, we also estimated Eq. (1) using a logit estimator, for which the 
standard errors are corrected for clustering. Taking into account that observations within the same 
firm are not independent, standard errors are corrected for clustering across firms. Alternatively, 
standard errors are corrected for clustering across main banks, taking into consideration the 
possibility that observations of firms which have a transaction relationship with the same bank are 
not independent. In both cases, the logit estimation results with clustered standard errors are 




 In addition, bank characteristics may affect firms’ export decision. For example, the 
Japan Bank for International Corporation (JBIC, what used to be the Export-Import Bank of 
Japan) is a government financial institution which was originally established to promote 
cross-border trade and foreign investment. Therefore, JBIC may be particularly active in helping 
firms to start exporting. On the other hand, major commercial banks may differ from regional 
banks or local banks in terms of their scope of business and hence in the characteristics of 
information accumulated by them. In order to control for differences in bank characteristics, we 
include a JBIC dummy and a dummy for major commercial banks in the export decision 
estimation. However, neither dummy variable has a significant coefficient, and including these 
dummy variables does not change the significance of the BANKINFO variable. 
 Finally, there may be several alternative ways to measure the amount of information on 
export markets available to a firm. While our main variable, BANKINFO, measures the intensity 
of banks’ exposure to exporting firms, the absolute number of a bank’s export client firms, 
                                                  
25 The estimation results are available upon request from the authors. 
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NUM_EXPORTER may be a better way to measure the amount of information on export markets. 
In the first and second columns in Table 9, we show the estimation results based on the same 
model as Equation (2) in Table 5 using either NUM_EXPORT or LN_NUM_EXPORT (the natural 
logarithm of NUM_EXPORT) instead of BANKINFO. Taking account of the high correlation 
between these two variables and NUM_CLIENT, we exclude NUM_CLIENT from our explanatory 
variables. The results imply that firms whose main bank has transaction relationships with a larger 
number of exporters are more likely to start exporting. On the other hand, NUM_CLIENT does not 
have a significant coefficient in the third column in Table 9. These results suggest that main banks 
with a larger number of exporting client firms more likely provide non-exporting client firms 
effective information on foreign markets and positively affect their export decision. 
 We also conduct two additional estimations for the robustness check using sub-samples 
of our sample firms. First, due to the manner of calculating BANKINFO, we might wrongly 
measure each bank’s exposure to export market information when the number of client firms for a 
bank is very small. In fact, some of the regional banks have a limited number of listed companies 
as their clients. In such a case, BANKINFO might not work as a good proxy for the information 
related to export markets. In Table 10, we limit our sample firms to firms whose main bank has 
more than 30 (first and third columns) or 50 (second and fourth columns) client firms 
(NUM_CLIENT). The results are consistent with those presented in Table 5, which confirms the 
robustness of our results. Second, BANKINFO could largely vary due to mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) among banks. In fact, a certain amount of variation in BANKINFO in the 2000s is driven 
by M&As among banks. In order to exclude the effect of banks’ M&As and check the robustness 
of our results, we repeat the same estimations as those in Table 5 excluding the sample firms 
whose main banks experienced M&As. The results summarized in Table 11 show the consistent 




5. Concluding Remarks 
                                                  
26 In addition, we may need to control for shocks to banks’ balance sheets as well as for firms’ credit constraints. 
Other tasks left for the future are as follows. First, the results in Paravisini et al. (2011) imply that firms match with 
banks that have developed an expertise on certain export destinations, which other lenders may not have. Firms 
and banks are not randomly matched. We address this endogeneity issue by restricting our sample to firms which 
did not change their main bank during the three years prior to starting exporting. However, there may be some 
alternative ways to address this issue more rigorously. Second, the loan share of the main bank for each firm can be 
taken into account when constructing the BANKINFO. Doing this allows us to measure not only the information 
accumulated in a main bank but also how smoothly or frequently the information could be transmitted to client 
firms. The closer the relationships that a non-exporting firm has with banks that have a large exposure to exporting 
firms, the more the non-exporting firm would benefit from the information accumulated by the banks. Third, we 
could take into account information accumulated by the second or third lender banks for each firm. However, 
according to an interview we conducted with a bank, firms usually consult their main bank (i.e., top lender) first on 
various issues related to their business. Firms ask their second or third, etc., lender bank for help only in cases 
where the main bank cannot provide satisfactory support to the client firm. Therefore, focusing only on main banks 
appears to be an appropriate and reasonable strategy. 
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 In this paper, we examined whether information spillovers through main banks affect 
client firms’ export behavior (i.e., the extensive and intensive margins). We find that information 
spillovers through main banks have a positive effect on client firms’ decision to start exporting. 
This implies that information on destination markets provided by main banks substantially reduces 
the fixed entry cost of exporting and encourages firms to become exporters. On the other hand, we 
did not find evidence that information spillovers through main banks have an effect on the export 
volume or on the growth rate of exports. This is more or less consistent with the findings obtained 
by Koenig et al. (2010).
27
 
A key contribution of this paper is that it proposes an additional channel of information 
spillovers ignored in previous studies. While existing studies, such as Koenig et al. (2010), 
concentrate on information spillovers from other exporting firms in the same region and/or 
industry, this study focuses on the importance of information provided directly by main lender 
banks through transaction relationships. If we look at our results in terms of the argument put 
forward by Chaney (2008) that a change in fixed costs only affects the extensive margin, while a 
change in variable costs affects both the intensive and the extensive margin, they suggest that 
information provided by banks contributes to a reduction in the fixed costs but not in the variable 
costs associated with exporting. On the other hand, Paravisini et al. (2011) suggest that credit 
frictions, by affecting the cost of working capital, affect the variable costs of exporting and hence 
the volume of exports. This result suggests that banks may play an important role in affecting the 
intensive margin as suppliers of funds. Thus, banks’ role as suppliers of funds and as providers of 
information may affect fixed and variable costs and hence the extensive and the intensive margin 
differently. Untangling these two roles of banks and their impact on firms’ export behavior is a 
topic we aim to further address in future research.  
This paper also provides an important policy implication. As mentioned in the 
introduction, our knowledge regarding what factors are important for firms to become an exporter 
remains very limited, even though export promotion has been an important policy issue in many 
countries. With regard to Japan, studies such as Wakasugi et al. (2008) and Ito (2011) argue that 
there are still many firms which do not export even though their performance is good or they 
actively invest in research and development. Promoting exports by these firms is an urgent policy 
issues for Japan, which has been facing population decline and sluggish domestic demand for a 
prolonged period. This paper showed the importance of banks’ role as an information provider for 
                                                  
27 It is possible that the information provided by a bank may lower the volatility of export volumes after the firm 
has started exporting, depending on what type of fixed costs were reduced as a result of the information provided 
by the bank. For example, export volumes may fluctuate less after starting exporting if the information provided by 
the bank lowers uncertainty in foreign markets.(We are grateful to Taiji Furusawa for pointing this out to us.) 
Examining the volatility of export volumes through, for example, heteroskedastic regression (Harvey 1976), would 
be another interesting issue to investigate. 
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potential exporters, implying that the government should proactively involve banks in its export 
promotion policies. Regional banks – seeing their client firms face declining domestic demand and 
therefore worried that their own business may shrink – may also be interested in providing more 
support services for firms trying to expand their business abroad. Helping such banks to build 
international service networks and building on the banks’ support services may allow the 
government to implement its export promotion policies more effectively. Moreover, since banks 
have accumulated a lot of information on their client firms’ business, they may have useful 
knowledge on what type of firms should receive support from the government and on what type of 
support is most effective. Of course, government and non-profit organizations already provide 
various support services for firms’ international business and for trading companies. Information 
provided by such organizations or trading companies is complementary to information collected 
by banks through lending relationships, and it is important for the government to effectively utilize 
these various information sources for export promotion policies. According to the banker we 
interviewed, the advantage that banks have is that they possess detailed and wide-ranging 
information on individual firms’ management, financial health, and business activities. 
To conclude, we highlight several issues for future research. The first of these concerns 
the type of information provided by banks. While the information we considered was 
destination-specific information, it would be possible to take other, more detailed types of 
information additionally into account, such as industry-specific information. Second, our relatively 
long-panel dataset allows us to conduct a survival analysis-type of study on the status of exporting 
firms. This, in turn, allows us to examine how the duration of staying in export markets is 
determined, which is another important dimension discussed in the theoretical international trade 
literature (e.g., Schröder and Sørensen 2012). Although there are a fair number of empirical 
studies analyzing the determinants of the duration of imports, studies on the determinants of what 
kind of firms are “always” exporters so far have all been only at an aggregate level (e.g., Besedeš 
and Prusa 2006a, 2006b, Nitsch 2009, Besedeš and Blyde 2010). Third, although the expansion of 
export destinations, particularly in the case of larger listed firms, often involves the establishment 
of new subsidiaries or affiliates abroad, this paper, partly because of data constraints, only focused 
on exporting and did not explicitly deal with foreign direct investment in a new location. As banks 
provide a wide range of support services for firms which try to open a foreign affiliate, 
investigating banks’ role in firms’ FDI decision is another promising research topic. Lastly, our 
results imply that information spillovers through main banks may be more important for smaller 
firms, which are more likely to choose Asia as their first export destination. Therefore, further 
investigation focusing on smaller firms would be a worthwhile exercise, if data for small firms 
20 
 
were available. We believe that all of these extensions would provide further evidence for a better 
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Appendix: The multilateral TFP index 
As detailed in Fukao et al. (2011), the TFP level of firm i in industry j in year t, TFPi,j,t is 
defined in comparison with the TFP level of a hypothetical representative firm in the benchmark 
year t0 in industry j. In the EALC 2010 Database, the benchmark year t0 is set to the year 2000 and 
the firm-level TFP level is calculated as follows, using the multilateral TFP index method 
developed by Good et al. (1997):. 
 
LN(TFPi,j,t) = {LN(Qi,j,t) − LN(Qj,t)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅} −∑(Si,k,j,t + Sk,j,t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) {LN(Xi,k,j,t) − LN(Xk,j,t)




for t = t0 
 
LN(TFPi,j,t) = {LN(Qi,j,t) − LN(Qj,t)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅} −
1
2
∑(Si,k,j,t + Sk,j,t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) {LN(Xi,k,j,t) − LN(Xk,j,t)





̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − LN(Qj,s−1)






(Sk,j,s̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + Sk,j,s−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) {LN(Xk,j,s)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − LN(Xk,j,s−1)






for t > t0 
LN(TFPi,j,t) = {LN(Qi,j,t) − LN(Qj,t)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅} −
1
2
∑(Si,k,j,t + Sk,j,t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) {LN(Xi,k,j,t) − LN(Xk,j,t)





̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − LN(Qj,s−1)






(Sk,j,s̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + Sk,j,s−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) {LN(Xk,j,s)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − LN(Xk,j,s−1)






for t < t0 
 
where Qi,j,t stands for the real output (real sales) of firm i (in industry j) in year t, Xi,k,j,t 
represents the real input of production factor k of firm i (in industry j) in year t, and Si,j,k,t is the 
cost share of production factor k at firm i (in industry j) in year t. 𝐿𝑁(𝑄𝑗,𝑡)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ denotes the 
arithmetic average of the log value of the output, in year t, of all firms in industry j to which 
firm i belongs, while 𝐿𝑁(𝑋𝑘,𝑗,𝑡)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ stands for the arithmetic average of the log value of the 
input of production factor k, in year t, of all firms in industry j to which firm i belongs. Finally, 
𝑆𝑘,𝑗,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the arithmetic average of the cost share of the input of production factor k, in year t, 
of all firms in industry j to which firm i belongs. 
25 
 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































City bank 208 0.66
City bank 138 0.58
Trust bank 52 0.56
City bank 52 0.50
Other 47 0.51
City bank 44 0.64
City bank 43 0.51
Trust bank 43 0.47
City bank 41 0.61
Trust bank 31 0.45
Long-term 28 0.61
Regional 26 0.77






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Distribution of sample firms by industry and year 
 
   
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Food and kindred products 43 41 40 32 32 34 44 44 52 362
Textile mill products, apparel 18 23 20 17 13 18 22 24 22 177
Lumber and wood products,
furniture and fixtures
2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 7
Paper and allied products 9 9 9 9 10 8 13 13 12 92
Printing, publishing and allied
products
7 5 6 5 4 5 9 9 10 60
Chemicals 31 30 31 25 36 41 49 47 51 341
Petroleum and coal products 2 1 3 2 0 0 2 1 1 12
Rubber and miscellaneous
plastics
6 4 7 5 5 5 4 7 10 53
Stone, clay and glass products 13 13 16 15 17 16 18 21 21 150
Metal 10 12 14 9 11 9 21 21 23 130
Non-metallic mining 11 8 7 6 5 6 12 12 15 82
Fabricated metal 15 15 14 9 11 10 20 19 19 132
Non-electrical machinery 18 15 13 12 19 24 26 35 32 194
Electrical and electronic
machinery




28 36 31 28 36 43 44 46 46 338
Instruments 7 8 5 3 4 3 3 7 8 48
Miscellaneous manufacturing 19 18 17 19 16 17 20 21 22 169
Total 291 285 284 235 268 301 373 403 422 2,862
32 
 
Table 5: Random-effect panel probit estimation results for extensive margin 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
† The BANKINFO variable for Columns (1) - (4) is measured regardless of the destination region, 
while the BANKINFO variable in Column (5) is measured for each destination region.     
  
Extensive Margin dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
LN_NUMWORKER 0.0594 0.0612 0.0849 ** 0.0853 ** 0.0890 **
(0.0675) (0.0672) (0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0369) 
FLEV 0.3496 0.3010 0.3927 0.3858 0.3923
(0.6523) (0.6510) (0.3297) (0.3290) (0.3237) 
FBDEP 0.8656 * 0.7559 * 0.0266 0.0231 0.0250
(0.4495) (0.4435) (0.2334) (0.2332) (0.2290) 
FLIQ 0.3966 *** 0.3785 *** -0.0478 -0.0484 -0.0456
(0.1466) (0.1473) (0.0734) (0.0733) (0.0725) 
STLOAN 0.2612 0.3073 0.0411 0.0447 0.0383
(0.2383) (0.2377) (0.1133) (0.1129) (0.1117) 
WAGE -0.0330 -0.0349 0.0068 0.0066 0.0111
(0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0216) 
FOR_BRANCH 0.5277 0.5627 -0.6871 -0.6884 -0.6460
(1.1716) (1.1886) (0.4553) (0.4552) (0.4491) 
FOR_EMP 24.5621 21.5684 16.4349 ** 16.4852 ** 15.5256 **
(15.5615) (16.1527) (6.5394) (6.5388) (6.4744) 
FOR_INV 0.2521 0.2648 -0.0238 -0.0251 -0.0140
(0.2245) (0.2179) (0.0889) (0.0888) (0.0869) 
FOR_LOAN -0.5484 * -0.5297 0.0226 0.0215 0.0315
(0.3287) (0.3291) (0.1218) (0.1217) (0.1203) 
TFP -10.8578 ** -0.4327 -1.2803 0.2251 -0.0084
(5.3428) (0.8626) (3.3607) (0.4695) (0.4941) 
BANKINFO
† 2.7098 *** 2.0666 ** 1.5565 ** 1.5628 ** 0.4764 **
(0.9117) (0.8510) (0.6591) (0.6597) (0.2028) 
TFP×BANKINFO
† 19.4209 ** 2.8644 3.3046
(9.7683) (6.3235) (2.2393) 
NUM_CLIENT 0.0008 * 0.0007 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
# Obs 1,178 1,178 2,589 2,589 2,570
# Groups 304 304 562 562 561
Obs per group: min 1 1 1 1 4
avg 3.9 3.9 4.6 4.6 4.6
max 10 10 9 9 9
Wald chi2 56.62 54.74 232.58 232.48 239.03
Prob > chi2 0.0265 0.0303 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Log likelihood -313.15 -315.27 -942.19 -942.29 -933.58
Likelihood ratio test
of rho0=0
5.23 5.53 1.83 1.8 0.61
Prob >= chibar2 0.011 0.009 0.088 0.09 0.217
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes














Table 6: Panel logit estimation results for extensive margin 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
† The BANKINFO variable for Columns (1) - (3) is measured regardless of the destination region, 
while the BANKINFO variable in Column (4) is measured for each destination region.   
  
(PA) (FE) (RE) (FE)
Extensive Margin Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
LN_NUMWORKER 1.1232 * 1.2843 1.1346 * 1.2746
(0.0714) (0.3007) (0.0779) (0.2972) 
FLEV 4.3200 *** 8.0844 4.5162 *** 11.0653
(2.3778) (15.5052) (2.6429) (21.3757) 
FBDEP 0.9486 3.1914 0.9595 3.5039
(0.3790) (3.3545) (0.4077) (3.6864) 
FLIQ 1.1388 1.0604 1.1401 1.0357
(0.1368) (0.2999) (0.1446) (0.2969) 
STLOAN 1.2091 1.4647 1.2230 1.4673
(0.2364) (0.6397) (0.2520) (0.6461) 
WAGE 1.0447 0.9916 1.0486 1.0125
(0.0387) (0.0635) (0.0411) (0.0662) 
FOR_BRANCH 0.4969 0.0572 ** 0.4478 0.0847 *
(0.3790) (0.0759) (0.3644) (0.1128) 
FOR_EMP 4.15E+09 ** 3.12E+29 *** 5.16E+10 ** 4.03E+27 ***
(4.40E+10) (5.75E+30) (5.95E+11) (7.38E+28)
FOR_INV 1.0870 0.7765 1.0813 0.8321
(0.1633) (0.2759) (0.1713) (0.2890) 
FOR_LOAN 1.1376 1.3147 1.1477 1.2993
(0.2333) (0.4694) (0.2505) (0.4673) 
TFP 0.1079 0.0076 0.1224 2.3192
(0.6546) (0.0712) (0.7748) (3.6080) 
BANKINFO
† 20.8130 *** 8.9001 23.5516 ** 0.3393 **
(24.6440) (17.1476) (29.2406) (0.1519) 
TFP×BANKINFO
† 296.1543 3.66E+05 272.8471 3.16E+04 **
(3373.71) (6.50E+06) (3250.91) (1.59E+05)
NUM_CLIENT 1.0000 1.0006 1.0000 1.0003
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
# Obs 2,589 1,413 2,589 1,396
# Groups 562 252 562 251
Obs per group: min 1 2 1 2
avg 4.6 5.6 4.6 5.6
max 9 9 9 9
Wald chi2 229.99 204.65 205.27 208.51
Prob > chi2 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
Log likelihood - -383.54 -964.05 -375.10
Likelihood ratio test
of rho0=0
- - 4.72 -
Prob >= chibar2 - - 0.015 -
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies no no no no











Table 7: Random-effect panel probit estimation results for extensive margin by destination 
region 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
† The BANKINFO variable is measured for each destination region.   
  
Extensive Margin dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
LN_NUMWORKER 0.0581 0.4464 *** 0.1009 * 0.1576 * 0.1499 **
(0.0823) (0.1621) (0.0545) (0.0843) (0.0763) 
FLEV 0.7978 1.2477 1.0709 ** 1.4298 * 0.2956
(0.7941) (1.1094) (0.5092) (0.7510) (0.6552) 
FBDEP 0.4545 1.8494 ** -0.2969 -0.3514 -0.3018
(0.5209) (0.9449) (0.3508) (0.5145) (0.4636) 
FLIQ 0.3822 ** 0.3905 0.1073 0.1339 -0.2702 *
(0.1888) (0.2378) (0.1112) (0.1625) (0.1526) 
STLOAN 0.3607 0.4460 0.0302 -0.0789 -0.0437
(0.2663) (0.3702) (0.1705) (0.2536) (0.2199) 
WAGE -0.0798 -0.0997 0.0268 0.1146 ** 0.0641
(0.0511) (0.0658) (0.0327) (0.0456) (0.0410) 
FOR_BRANCH 0.0332 -2.4972 -0.3675 0.8157 0.2359
(1.5995) (2.1615) (0.7125) (0.8552) (0.8553) 
FOR_EMP 42.2748 ** 77.6527 ** 17.8788 * -2.6105 6.7518
(21.2118) (31.7772) (9.4868) (12.4718) (11.3327) 
FOR_INV -0.5063 0.5267 -0.0772 0.1686 0.2356
(0.3865) (0.3795) (0.1476) (0.1818) (0.1624) 
FOR_LOAN 0.0485 -0.7049 0.3178 * -0.0421 0.0036
(0.3312) (0.5758) (0.1718) (0.2431) (0.2387) 
TFP -0.5318 -5.0289 -1.1761 0.3440 1.2884
(7.3806) (5.7492) (2.3737) (0.9744) (2.3621) 
BANKINFO
† 2.8382 ** 0.6886 1.4655 -0.0336 1.0355
(1.4160) (1.5599) (1.1103) (0.2954) (1.0289) 
TFP×BANKINFO
† 1.7274 14.4149 8.8588 -3.6875 -6.3045
(13.7284) (13.6617) (9.3470) (14.2688) (9.1479) 
NUM_CLIENT 0.0008 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
# Obs 815 1,143 1,910 1,649 1,969
# Groups 213 275 483 434 454
Obs per group: min 1 1 1 1 1
avg 3.8 4.2 4 3.8 4.3
max 9 9 9 9 9
Wald chi2 41.33 22.84 164.84 82.65 40.6
Prob > chi2 0.249 0.9672 0.0000 0.0000 0.3147
Log likelihood -157.3956 -197.99 -453.62 -323.76 -346.42
Likelihood ratio test
of rho0=0
0 7.25 1.46 9.2 4.39
Prob >= chibar2 1 0.004 0.113 0.001 0.018
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEW_EXP_ASIA NEW_EXP_NA NEW_EXP_CSA NEW_EXP_AFR NEW_EXP_OCE
35 
 
Table 8: Fixed-effect panel estimation results for intensive margin 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered within a firm are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
  
Panel (a): All regions
Intensive Margin Coefficient Coefficient
LN_NUMWORKER 0.1596 -0.4597 ***
(0.2083) (0.1744) 


























_cons 7.2424 *** 4.0855 ***
(1.7397) (1.4323) 
# Obs 1,656 1,328
# Groups 426 389




Prob > F 0 0.011
R-sq: within 0.0872 0.03
between 0.3209 0.0169
overall 0.247 0.0028
corr(u_i, Xb) 0.3668 -0.7657
Year dummies yes yes





Table 8: Fixed-effect panel estimation results for intensive margin  --- continued --- 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered within a firm are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Results for other explanatory variables not shown to 
conserve space. Most coefficients were found to be not statistically significant. 
 
  
Panel (b): Estimated coefficient for BANKINFO by destination region
Intensive Margin Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Dependent variable: LN_EXPORT
BANKINFO -0.4527 -0.4859 -2.3443 0.1132 -2.3285
(0.5260) (0.5162) (2.6461) (0.7668) (1.3063) 
# Obs 1,600 1,172 504 229 447
# Groups 415 348 261 147 199
Obs per group: min 1 1 1 1 1
avg 3.9 3.4 1.9 1.6 2.2
max 9 9 8 7 8
F 5.39 6.15 3.8 3.03 2.73
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0.0002
R-sq: within 0.1024 0.37 0.29 0.33 0.16
between 0.2539 0.1355 0.1507 0.0185 0.0965
overall 0.1877 0.1298 0.1466 0.0468 0.1346
corr(u_i, Xb) 0.2644 0.0265 -0.1877 -0.3475 -0.035
Dependent variable: ΔLN_EXPORT
BANKINFO -0.1269 -1.1411 * -2.0576 -2.8330 ** -6.1500 ***
(0.7294) (0.6456) (2.6331) (1.4032) (1.7790) 
# Obs 1,281 861 232 80 251
# Groups 381 291 103 48 117
Obs per group: min 1 1 1 1 1
avg 3.4 3 2.3 1.7 2.1
max 9 9 7 6 7
F 1.26 6.16 7.82 . .
Prob > F 0.2057 0 0 . .
R-sq: within 0.0225 0.49 0.40 0.67 0.17
between 0.002 0.3065 0.0167 0.0119 0.0267
overall 0.0008 0.3797 0.0729 0.02 0.0286
corr(u_i, Xb) -0.7252 -0.3769 -0.6869 -0.9978 -0.6516
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes












Table 9: Random-effect panel probit estimation results for extensive margin 
(NUM_EXOPRTER) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
  
Extensive Margin dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
LN_NUMWORKER 0.0728 0.0731 0.0753
(0.0690) (0.0697) (0.0701) 
FLEV 0.4042 0.4154 0.4190
(0.6677) (0.6745) (0.6769) 
FBDEP 0.7298 0.7272 0.7395
(0.4541) (0.4578) (0.4598) 
FLIQ 0.3911 *** 0.3903 *** 0.3964 ***
(0.1495) (0.1505) (0.1519) 
STLOAN 0.3419 0.3423 0.3531
(0.2439) (0.2458) (0.2467) 
WAGE -0.0360 -0.0347 -0.0322
(0.0426) (0.0429) (0.0430) 
FOR_BRANCH 0.6481 0.6836 0.7460
(1.2122) (1.2172) (1.2240) 
FOR_EMP 19.5788 18.8347 18.6063
(16.4042) (16.4003) (16.4596) 
FOR_INV 0.2439 0.2474 0.2376
(0.2236) (0.2259) (0.2274) 
FOR_LOAN -0.4911 -0.4930 -0.4677
(0.3329) (0.3350) (0.3347) 
TFP -0.3670 -0.4631 -0.3705







# Obs 1,178 1,178 1,178
# Groups 304 304 304
Obs per group: min 1 1 1
avg 3.9 3.9 3.9
max 10 10 10
Wald chi2 51.32 49.69 48.73
Prob > chi2 0.047 0.0641 0.0765
Log likelihood -316.66 -317.23 -318.09
Likelihood ratio test of
rho0=0
6.94 7.43 7.67E+00
Prob >= chibar2 0.004 0.003 0.003
Year dummies yes yes yes







Table 10: Random-effect panel probit estimation results for extensive margin (Sample split 
by NUM_CLIENT) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
Extensive Margin dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
LN_NUMWORKER 0.0546 0.0718 0.0775 ** 0.0814 **
(0.0684) (0.0704) (0.0378) (0.0381) 
FLEV 0.3368 0.5318 0.3923 0.4070
(0.6642) (0.6854) (0.3327) (0.3378) 
FBDEP 0.8516 * 1.0322 ** -0.0324 -0.0096
(0.4571) (0.4767) (0.2359) (0.2411) 
FLIQ 0.3905 *** 0.4319 *** -0.0509 -0.0358
(0.1480) (0.1613) (0.0739) (0.0745) 
STLOAN 0.2673 0.2736 0.0223 0.0323
(0.2430) (0.2509) (0.1145) (0.1161) 
WAGE -0.0350 -0.0428 0.0061 0.0101
(0.0421) (0.0430) (0.0219) (0.0222) 
FOR_BRANCH 0.4500 0.3419 -0.6851 -0.7980 *
(1.1816) (1.2156) (0.4583) (0.4653) 
FOR_EMP 24.7524 26.6852 * 16.9833 *** 16.7708 **
(15.5839) (15.9555) (6.6133) (6.6771) 
FOR_INV 0.2590 0.2259 -0.0346 -0.0351
(0.2279) (0.2324) (0.0895) (0.0903) 
FOR_LOAN -0.5502 * -0.5374 0.0186 0.0111
(0.3310) (0.3347) (0.1221) (0.1237) 
TFP -11.8980 ** -11.7997 ** -1.9910 0.8182
(5.7548) (6.1490) (3.5450) (3.8304) 
BANKINFO
† 2.6902 *** 2.8001 *** 1.4519 ** 1.5710 **
(0.9427) (0.9953) (0.6875) (0.7774) 
TFP×BANKINFO
† 21.4722 ** 20.9268 * 4.0608 -1.4975
(10.5769) (11.2461) (6.6871) (7.2416) 
NUM_CLIENT 0.0007 0.0010 * 0.0000 0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
# Obs 1,137 1,088 2,542 2,436
# Groups 299 289 555 545
Obs per group: min 1 1 1 1
avg 3.8 3.8 4.6 4.5
max 10 10 9 9
Wald chi2 53.39 50.24 230.25 223.49
Prob > chi2 0.05 0.0887 0.0000 0.0000
Log likelihood -310.20 -297.82 -931.55 -892.87
Likelihood ratio test of
rho0=0
5.55 5.26 1.81 1.45
Prob >= chibar2 0.009 0.011 0.089 0.114
Year dummies yes yes yes yes

















Table 11: Random-effect panel probit estimation results for extensive margin (Subsample 
not being affected by M&A) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
Extensive Margin dy/dx dy/dx




FBDEP 0.9798 ** 0.0149
(0.4810) (0.2711) 














TFP -12.2375 ** -1.7633
(6.2281) (4.1570) 
BANKINFO
† 3.0662 *** 1.6095 **
(1.0164) (0.8030) 
TFP×BANKINFO
† 21.5514 * 3.2155
(11.2464) (7.8535) 
NUM_CLIENT 0.0009 * 0.0000
(0.0005) (0.0003) 
# Obs 818 1,799
# Groups 247 478
Obs per group: min 1 1
avg 3.3 3.8
max 10 9
Wald chi2 48.04 209.93
Prob > chi2 0.1274 0
Log likelihood -217.49 -618.67
Likelihood ratio test of
rho0=0
0.35 1.20E-04
Prob >= chibar2 0.278 0.496
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
(1) (2)
NEW_EXP
NEW_EXP_REG
ION
